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B. The decision was basedon the theory that the state courts'

reversalof interpretationof the statute was a law impairingthe
obligation of contracts.
The purpose of the preceding section will become more evident as we proceed. We have attempted to show, and it is
believed that it has been shown, that in cases involving statutory construction, the federal courts have acknowledged their
duty to adopt the judgment of the state court as final.
It has often been said, however, that Gelocke v. Dubuque and
kindred cases form an exception to that rule. On principle it
is clear that Gelpcke v. Dubuque must be justified, if at all, on
one of three grounds:
(i) On the theory that the federal courts are not bound to
follow state constructions.
(2) On the theory that the rule, as above laid down, exists,
but that there is an exception, for some occult reason, in the
case of contracts.
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(3) On the theory that a federal question was involved. If
the decision can be explained, without adopting one of these
viewi, we are unable to comprehend that explanation.
The foregoing section has proven that the first view is untenable, even if it had ever been urged. We believe that the
same principle, as there investigated, renders impossible the
second view. It is not necessary here to further elaborate on
the principle as discussed in the latter part of the preceding
section. As there stated, the federal courts, either have, or
have not, the right to construe state statutes. If they have
not, and we have shown that they have not, then, where the
power does not exist, no "exceptions" can arise. This on
principle seems plain. But, it is said, the federal courts have
made an exception. This, however, begs the question. -In the
first place, it is not a legitimate argument for the correctness
of a principle discussed on a !priorigrounds, to cite a decision;
and, in the second place, it is yet to be demonstrated that these
cases were decided on that principle.
All text writers who advance. the "exception " theory,
declare, at the same time, that the theory is unsound. This
brings us to the conclusion towards which all the argument so
far has been directed. Either Gelipcke v. Dubuque is a wrong
decision, or else it involves afederalquestion. Having on principle reached this conclusion, we proceed to find out what was,
in fact, the basis of the decision.
Ever since the case was decided, text writers have been advancing theories upon which, in their opinions, the case was
rested. Professor Thayer, in an article in the HarvardLaw
Review I upholds the decision, but places it upon the ground
of bias. That is, he says, where the federal courts have
reason to believe that the state courts have been partial in
administering the state law, they can, themselves, entirely
disregard the state law. This seems to be a remarkable conclusion. As Professor Thayer, himself, says, one reason for
establishing the Circuit Courts, was to provide an impartial
tribunal wherein the law of the state should be administered;
14 Harv. Law Rev., 311 (1891).
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and yet in order to administer impartially that law of the state,
the federal courts may entirely disregard it, and administer some
other law, for it must be conceded. that the decisions of the state
court are what, within the thirty-fourth section of the Judikiary
Act, do constitute the law of the state. From the standpoint
of at least one of the parties, who has a legal right to have the
law of the state applied to his case, this would scarcely seem
to be a notable instance of impartiality. To allow such" a
latitude as this, in the case of "bias," would be to give the
federal courts an unlimited right to disregard state laws whenever they see fit to do so. With the greatest respect for the
eminent writer, it is submitted that the decision cannot be supported upon this theory, and there is no ground for believing
it to have been the basis of the court's opinion.
Hon. Henry Reed, in his article entitled "The Rule in
Gelpcke v. Dubuique,"' makes an exhaustive examination of
the cases, and ends by declaring Gelpeke v. Dubuque to be an
anomalous case, which is unknown elsewhere in the law. He
does not seek the principle upon which it was founded, but
contents himself by saying that the decision was just, has not
been overruled, and was made necessary by peculiar circumstances. This may be a satisfactory conclusion to the utilitarian, but is certainly most disappointing to a student of law.
The fact that the decision is just, should lend additional
diligence to the search for its underlying principle, but of
itself is not a sufficient answer to legal objections to its
soundness.
Professor Pepper, in his book above referred to, seems to
think the decision recognizes an exception to the duty of the
federal courts to " follow," and therefore questions its soundness.
Mr. William B. Hornblower 2 and Mr. Conrad Reno,' in two
well considered articles, support the case on the theory that it
involves a federal question.
9 Am. Law Rev., 381 (1871).
14 Am. Law Rev. 211.
3 23 Am. Law Rev. i9o.
2
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'Mr. William I. Rand, Jr.,' places the decision upon the
same ground, but intimates his opinion that it cannot be
supported.
Professor Patterson says that under the word "law," as
used in the federal clause forbidding states to impair the obligation of contracts, is included "judicial decisions of state
courts of last resort, rendered subsequently to the making of
the contract in question, and antecedently to the suit in which
the court determines the invalidity of the contract, and altering
by construction the constitution and statutes of the state in
force when the contract was made,"' citing Gelpcke v. Dubuque.
Mr. Cooley also places the decision on the ground that the
federal clause was violated
The case is referred to without comment in a note to Story
on the Constitution.4 No reason is given for the conclusion
reached therein.
Hon. J. I. Clark Hare, however, gives a careful discussion
of the entire series of cases represented by Gelpcke v. Dubuque,
and clearly intimates his opinion that the case was decided on
the theory that the state courts' decision was a "law" within
the meaning of the federal clause
Enough has been said to show that text writers generally,
certainly all whose works are recognized as standard authorities, concur in the opinion that the decision in Gelpcke v.
Dubuque was founded on the theory that a federal question
was involved. But however much we may prize the opinions
of writers, after all the best source of knowledge is the case
itself, and the comments upon it in later opinions of the same
court.
Mr. Justice Swayne delivered the opinion. His language
has been the subject of much adverse comment. It must be
conceded that the learned justice leaves much to be desired.
However, if his opinion be examined with a view to discover'8 Harv. Law Rev. 328.
2

Federal Restraints on State Action, pp. x46-147.

'Cooley's Principles of Const. Law, p. 312.
Vol II, pp. 575-576.
•Hare's American Const. Law, pp. 72r-,26.
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ing the underlying principle which was in the mind of the
court, it is thought that the examination will not prove so
unsatisfactory as at first appears.. In the first place, we must
assume that the rule that the federal courts are bouiid to
follow the state courts' construction of their own laws, was
present in the mind of Mr. Justice Swayne. The strongest
proof of this is the language of Mr. Justice Miller., dissenting.
He Says, "The general principle is not controverted by the
majority, that to the highest courts of the state belongs the
right to construe its statutes and its constitution, except where"
they may conflict with the Constitution of the United States,
or some statute or treaty made under it. Nor is it denied that
when such a construction has been given by the state court,
that this court is bound to follow it." Further, he calls attention to the language of Mr. Justice Swayne in the case of.
Lefzingwell v. Warren,' which was decided at the next preceding term of court. In that case Mr. Justice Swayne says,
"'The construction given to a state statute by the highest
judicial tribunal of such state, is regarded as a part of the

statute, and is as binding upon the courts of the United States
as the text...
If the highest judicial tribunal of a state
adopt new views as to the proper construction of such a
statute, and reverse its former decisions, this court will follow
the latest settled adjudications." No language can be more
clear or explicit than this. It is impossible to believe that
Mr. Justice Swayne could have overlooked this principle in
preparing his opinion. We assume that it was in his mind at
the time. He must have grounded his decision upon a well
defined exception to the rule, or upon the theory that the
state court's decision violated a federal clause.
It may here be parenthetically remarked that Mr. Justice
Miller's suggestion that the court were influenced in their
decision, because they considered the state construction to be
unsettled, will not bear examination. Mr. Justice Swayne,
on page 205, says it is unnecessary to decide whether the
construction was or was not settled, as the point was not
12 Black, 599.
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material. It could not, therefore, have been the basis of thedecision.
We- return to the proposition just stated. The decision
must have rested upon a federal question, or upon a well
defined exception to the rule. Nowhere in the language of
the court is there a suggestion of an exception to be engrafted
upon the principle that the federal courts are bound to follow
the construction of the state courts.
The first half of the opinion is devoted to a discussion of
the legality of the state legislation. It has been suggested
that the excitement and unrest, during the time of the Civil
War, was largely responsible for the decision in this case.
That it was a violent reaction from the doctrine of States'
Rights which was at that time being pressed so disastrously
by the states of the South. This may have been, to a great
extent, true. This may have been the primary cause for the
discussion of a clearly irrelevant question, in the early part of
Mr. Justice Swayne's opinion. That it was irrelevant, and
that Mr. Justice Swayne knew it was irrelevant, seems to be
very clear. Perhaps he desired to administer a rebuke to the
state for attempting to evade its obligations by a construction so palpably wrong as to be in conflict with the law of
sixteen other states," but that he intended to make that fact
the ground of his decision, it is impossible to believe.
Mr. Justice Swayne, as we have pointed out, in a case just
previous to Gelpcke v. Dubuque, clearly demonstrated his
belief in the duty of the federal courts, as a matter of obligation, to follow the state courts in cases precisely similar to the
one at bar. Is it conceivable that he had so soon forgotten
the rule he there laid down, and now, as Professor Pepper
says, "was assuming to administer not the law of Iowa, but
the law of sixteen other states?" It cannot be denied that
there is room for this criticism, because the opinion undoubtedly does remark upon the soundness of the former decisions,
as contrasted with what is said to be the unsoundness of the
latter. " It is insisted, however, that this discussion was given
merely for the purpose of exposing the intentions of the. state,
and not as a legal reason for the decision. A manifest error
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in paragraphing tends to substantiate the criticism. In the
report on p. 2o6, Mr. Justice Swayne closes his remarks concerning the erroneous character of the late Iowa decision.
His closing sentence is placed at the beginning of the" following paragraph, which deals with the question of the effect
to be given to the state decisions by the Supreme Court. The
last sentence in the preceding paragraph is, "Many of the
cases in the other states are marked by the profoundest legal
ability." This should be followed directly by the opening
sentence in the following paragraph : "The late case in Iowa,
and two other cases of a kindred character in another state,
also overruling earlier adjudications, stand out, as far as we
are adviied, in unenviable solitude and notoriety." The court
then begins an entirely different subject, and the one which"involves the real principle of the case. It is not surprising
that the second sentence in this paragraph should have been
thought to be a sequence of the first, quoted above, but the
subject matter of the two being entirely different, and there
being no connecting words, it seems clearly to be an error of
the transcriber. The next paragraph, as it should be arranged,
and which in our opinion embodies the real ground of the
decision whether right or wrong, reads as follows: " However we may regard the late case in Iowa as affecting the
future, it can have no effect upon the past. The sound and
true rule is, that if the contract, when made, was valid by the
laws of the state as then expounded by all departments of the
government, and administered in its courts of justice, its
validity and obligation cannot be impaired by any subsequent
action of legislation, or decision of its courts, alfring the construction of the lawv. The same rule applies where there is a
change of judicial decision, as to the constitutional power of
the legislature to enact the law. To this rule, thus enlarged,
we adhere. It is the law of this court. .It rests upon the
plainest principles of justice. To hold otherwise would be as
unjust as to hold that rights acquired under a statuite may he
loszt by its repeal. The rule embraces this case."
Whatever may be said of the ambiguity of spime portions
of Mr. Justice Swayne's opinion, certainly such a criticism
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cannot be applied to this paragraph. It is clear and emphatic.
If the-opinion had consisted of this alone, it would no doubt
have received much less censure than it has.
Gelpcke v. Dubuque has been followed by a long line of
cases in the Supreme Court. The principle uniformly adopted
as the one there laid down, is that when a state court has
altered the interpretation of a state statute, such decision
amounts to an amendment of the statute, and is, within the
meaning of the federal clause, a "law," which, when it impairs the obligation of contracts, must be deprived of its force
by the federal courts.' This is so well known that we refrain
from quoting from later cases. To recapitulate, the argument
hitherto may de briefly summarized as follows:
(i) The federal courts, when administering the law of the
state, are as fully bound to accept the states' courts' construtction
of state statutes as they are to accept the statutes themselves.
(2) As there is no exception to the duty of thefederal court to
accept the state statutes,so there is no excepton to the duty of the
federal court to accept the states' courts' construction of those
statutes, unless a federal question is involved. Both must stand
orfall together,for the courts have declared them to be of equal
rank.
(3)Mr.Justice Swayne was fully in accord witli
the rule as
above given, as evidenced by his opinions both before and after
Gelpcke v. Dubuque.
(4) Gelpcke v. Dubuque was decided on the ground that the
Iowa decision alteringthe construction of the statute was, within
I Thompson v. Lee Co., 3 Wall. 327 (1865), Davis, J.; Havemeyer z'.
Iowa Co., 3 Wall. 294 (i865), Swayne, J.; Lee Co. v. Rogers, 7 Wall. i8i
(x868), Nelson, J.; Butz v. Muscatine, 8 Wall. 575 (1869), Swayne, J.;
The City v. Lamson, 9 Wall. 477 (x869); Olcott v. Supervisors, 16 Wall.
678 (1872), Strong, J.; Township of Pine Grove v. Talcott, 19 Wall. 666
(1873), Swayne, J.; Boyd v. Ala., 94.U. S. 645 (1876); Town of S. Ottawa
v. Perkins, 94 U. S. 261 (1876); Douglas v. Co. of Pike, ioi U. S. 677
(1879), Waite, J.; Anderson i'. Santa Anna, 116 U. S. 356 (1885), Harlan,
J.; County v. Douglas, io5 U. S. 728 (188r), Waite, C.J.; Green v. County
of Conness, 1o9 U. S. io4, Bradley, J.; Louisiana v. Pilsbury, io5 U. S.
278 (1881), Field, J.; Ray v. Gas Co., 138 Pa. 391 (i89o), Clark, J.; Union
Bank v. Board, 90 Fed. 7 (1893) ; Louisville T. Co. v. Cincinnati, 76 Fed.
296 (iS96); Loeb z'. Trustees of Ham. Co., 91 Fed. 37 (1899).
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the meaning of the federal clause, a "law," which impaired the
obligation of contracts, and whick the federal courts might refuse
to apply for that reason.
SEcTION III.-THE DISSENTING OPINION OF MR. JUSTICE
MILLER.
Having reached the conclusion as to the basis of the decision in Gelpeke v. Dubuque, it remains to examine the
correctness of that principle. Before taking up that phase of
the subject, it may not be inappropriate to briefly refer, at this
point, to some of the objections which have been raised to the
decision. For the purposes of this paper, we may roughly
divide all these objections into two classes:
(i.) Objections to the statement that a judicial decision may
be a " law," when it construes a state statute.
(2.) Objectioris which have been raised to any other theory
of the case, among which are the "exception" and "bias"
theory.
If the argument heretofore is able to stand the test of investigation, we may disregard the second class of objections,
because we have shown that the case was not decided -on any
of those principles. This paper Would be incomplete, however, and its conclusions not well established, did we not give
some space to a more cafeful examination of that which is the
ground-work of nearly all later argument against the principle
of this case, the famous dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Miller.
Mr. Justice Miller's argument seems to assume that the court
had recognized ari exception to the rule that the federal courts
must adopt the state courts' construction of their own laws.
Mlost of his criticism, therefore, is levied at the "exception"
theory. In all of that criticism We fully concur, because, as
we have tried to show, there can be no exception to the rule.
It must stand or fall in its entirety. That Mr. Jtstice Miller
did not consider the case to be founded upon a constitutional
question would appear from the nature of his criticism, but
nevertheless, that he did rccognize to some extent, at least,
this view of the case, unmistakably appears from a careful
perusal of his opihion, as we shall tr to show later.
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He points out that the majority of the court do not controvert the principle "that to the highest court of the state
belongs the right to construe its statutes and its constitution,
e.xcept where they may conflict with the Constitution of the United
States, or some treaty or statute made under it." After having
made this clear statement, he proceeds to prove it by quoting
from former opinions of thejustices who composed the majority.
Then, in the next breath, he declares that the majority do
controvert the principle which he has just said they do not.
It will be noted that the only exception which Mr. Justice
Miller declares the majority recognize, is where the statute or
constitution of the state violates the federal constitution. In
the following paragraph he says: "But while admitting the
general principle, the court say it is inapplicable because there
have been conflicting decisions " in the state. This is the'first
reason which he conceives the"majority gave. That this is an
incorrect statement of the majority's conclusion appears by this
language taken from Mr. Justice Swayne's opinion, page 205:
Whether the judgment in question can, under the circumstances, be deemed to come within that category (' the latest
settled adjudications') it is not now necessary to determine."
In the same paragraph (p. 21O) Mr. Justice Miller gives
what he thinks was the second reason that induced the majority to decide as they did. He speaks of the "moral force"
of the proposition, and continues, "And I think, taken in connection with some fancied duty of this court to enforce contracts
over and beyond that appertaining to other courts, has given
the majority a leaning towards the adoption of a rule, which
in my opinion cannot be justified either on principle or authority." What that principle is, Mr. Justice Miller nowhere
in his opinion states more definitely than here. But whatever
he conceived it to be, it must have been an "exception," other
than the only one which, he had just carefully proven, the
majority entertained, if we concede that he did not recognize
a federal question to be the basis of the decision.
That these vague reasons form a very unsatisfactory explanation of the court's decision must be apparent to every one. It
seems little short of a contradiction for the eminent dissenting
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justice to say that no exception save where a federal question
was involved was recognized, and immediately to give as the
basis of the decision of that court, a very indefinite reason for
granting an exception other than that one.
He also seems inconsistent in another part of his opinion.
On pages 208-209 he says, "Yet this is in substance what the
majority of the court have decided. They have. said to the
Federal Court sitting in Iowa, ' You shall disregard this decision of the highest court of the state on this question.
Although you are sitting in the State of Iowa and administering her laws, and construing her constitution,, you shall not
follow the latest, though it be the soundest, exposition of its
constitution by the Supreme. Court of that state, but you shall
decide directly to the contrary, and where that court has said
that a statute is unconstitutional, you shall- say that it is constitutional. Where it says bonds are void, 'issued in the state,
because they violate its constitution, you shall say that they
are valid, because they do not violate its constitution." It is
submitted that nothing can be further from what the court
actually did say than the foregoing. According to this language, which is unlimited, the federal court claimed the right
to construe the constitution and statutes of the state whenever
it should choose to do so. The court distinctly disclaimed
such a right, as' Mr. Justice Miller, himself, had previously
pointed out. What the court did do, and all that they did do,
was to step in and protect the bonds held by the plaintiff,
To do this it was not necessary to arrogate to themselves the
right to dictate to the state what her laws should be; all they
said was, "y'ou shall not in this case app!;, a statute or a colstruction of a statute which impairsthe obli'-ationof this contract."
The court distinctly say, " However we may regard the late
case in Iowa as affecting the future, etc., etc.," thus plainly
intimating their inability to interfere in any way with the
rights of the state court.
That Mr. Justice Miller really recognized the truth of these
observations, appears from a sentence from his opinion, on
page 216: "In the present case, the court rests on the
former decision of the state court, declining to examine the
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constitlltional quesion for itsef." How does this sentence
comport with the one quoted above, where he declared that
the court by its decision had given the federal court sitting in
Iowa the right to decide that bonds were valid "because the
state statute was constitutional," that is because the federal
court thought, contrary to the state court, that it was constitutional ? It is one thing to claim a right to interpret a law
for a sovereign state, and to force that law upon that state, a
thing which, as Mr. Justice Miller points out, cannot be done; it
is quite a different thing to say to the state court, " Construe
your statutes as you will, and as is your undoubted right,
but when you attempt to apply that construction, so that it
impairs the obligation of contracts, we, by virtue of the federal
constitution, claim the right to forbid you."
That Mr. Justice Miller really knew this to be the attitude
of the court, is apparent from the fact that while mainly combatting what he thought to be the necessary principle of the
decision, the "exception" theory, yet at the same time he
advances at least two arguments against the "federal " theory.
On pages 2 IO-I I he declares that there can be no question
of the impairment of the obligation of contracts, because here
the court is called upon "to determine whether there ever
was a contract made in the case," not to enforce a contract
whose existence was undisputed. This objection will not
bear investigation. It assumes that the Iowa decision had
a retroactive effect, which is the very point at issue.
The next objection which, without naming it, Mr. Justice
Miller raises to the "federal" theory of Gelpcke v. Dubuque,
is that a judicial decision cannot be a law; thus, on page 2 11,
he says, "The decision of this court contravenes this principle
(i. e., that courts only interpret the law) and holds that the
decision of the court makes the law, and in fact the same
statute or constitution means one thing in 1853, and another
thing in 1859. For it is impliedly conceded that if these
bonds had been issued since the more recent decision of the
Iowa court, this court would not hold them valid." This last
sentence is plainly inconsistent with the sentence of Mr. Justice
Miller above quoted, where he declared in general terms that
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the federal courts claimed the right to construe the Iowa
statutes. Here he recognizes the scope of the decision to be
limited to the protection of this contract, by virtue of the fact
that it had been entered into before the decision of the Iowa
court, which by applying a changed construction of the statute,
impaired its obligation.
By the objection last referred to, Mr. Justice Miller has
touched the principle upon which Gelpeke v. Dubuque must
stand or fall. It is not proposed to discuss it here. His language is quoted to show that he, too, recognized the ground
of the decision to be that, in the opinion of the court, a judicial
decision can be a "law" within the meaning of the federal
clause, when it enters into and becomes part of a statute.
Mr. Justice Miller, however, persistently refused to recognize'
in terms that the court decided the case on this theory. The
entire tenor of the court's opinion was distasteful to him, as he
very plainly shows by his language, and as the thought that
the federal courts could usurp state rights affected him most
strongly, he dealt mainly with that view. Almost at the end
of his opinion he says, " I think I have sustained by this examination of the cases, the assertion made in the commencement of this opinion, that the court has, in this case, taken a
step in advance of anything heretofore decided by it on this
subject. That advance is in the direction of a usurpation of
the right which belongs to the state courts, to decide as a
finality upon the construction of state constitutions and state
statutes. This invasion is made in a case where there is no
.retense that the constitution, as thus construed,is any inbfraction
of the laws or Constitution of the United States." Side by side
with this last sentence we will place, at the risk of repetition,
a sentence from the opinion in which Mr. Justice Miller says
there is no "pretense" that a federal clause had been encroached upon: "The sound and true rule is, that if the
contract when made, was valid by the laws of the state as then
expounded by all departments of the government, and administered in its courts of justice, its validity and obligation cannot
be impaired by any subsequent act of legislation, or decision
of its courts altering the construction of the law. The same
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principle applies where there is a change of judicial decision,
as to the constitutional power of the legislature to enact the
law.- To this rule thus enlarged we adhere. It is the law of
this court. It rests upon the plainest principles of justice.
To hold otherwise would be as unjust as to hold that rights
acquired under a statute may be lost by its repeal. The rule
embraces this case."
On the whole, Mr. Justice Miller's dissenting opinion leaves
much to be desired. He does not plainly state what he considers to be the basis of the decision, but contents himself
with a vigorous if not entirely connected dissent to the whole
opinion. The chief source of dissatisfaction, however, lies in
the fact that he attacks not the principle upon which the
court actually based its opinion, so much as he attacks another
principle which he thinks must have been the basis of the decision, but which, it is submitted, was not and could not
have been.
If the contention as to what the underlying principle of the
case is has been established, then Mr. Justice Miller's opinion
is not pertinent except in so far as" it deals with the question
of judicial legislation.
SECTION

IV.-EXAMINATION OF AUTHORITIES FOR THE
PRINCIPLE INVOLVED.

In the discussion of the correctness or incorrectness of the
principle, which we have shown to be the foundation of
Gcdpcke v. Dubuque, we propose to proceed first, by examining the authorities, and secondly, by an investigation on a
priori grounds.
Before beginning an examination of the cases, let it be
remembered that this paper deals not so much with the question of the soundness or unsoundness of Gel cke v. Dubuque
as viewed in the light of the decided cases of that day, as
with the recent criticism of the position there assumed. We
therefore claim the right to examine all cases bearing on the
subject,'even Gelpcke v. Dubuque itself and kindred cases, in
order to throw light upon the attitude which the courts have
taken.
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In the first place, the courts have declared that
A. The judicial construction of a state statute hecomes a part
of the statute, as much so as ifincorporatedinto the text.
This expression has been so often used by the courts that
it scarcely needs to be supported by decisions. It has been
assumed by some text writers and by some judges that the
courts do not mean what they say by this statement. If is
said that to give it a literal meaning, would be to give to a
decision the force of a law. Feeling fearful of the consequences, should such a conclusion be established, the writers
and judges were driven to the result just mentioned, i. e., to
say that when the courts have plainly said one thing, they
mean something else. Whether the consequences of adopting
the heretical doctrine that a judicial decision may be a law,
would be so appalling as is feared by some eminent authorities, we shall not discuss at this point. The task now before
us is to prove that the courts have laid down the rule as
stated.
We have already proven that the federal courts are bound
to follow the construction of the state courts in cases involving
statute law. We have also shown that they receive the construction as a part of the statute. All that is necessary at
this point is to refer again to the language used in some of
those cases, with the idea of emphasizing the thought, that
the construction does actually become a part of the statute law.
In Ehnendorf v. Taylor,' Mr. Chief Justice Marshall says,
"We receive the construction given by the courts of the
nation (i. e., the state courts) as the true sense of the law, and
feel ourselves no more at liberty to depart from that construction than to depart from the words of the statute." Here he
plainly intimates his belief that the statutes and the construction are equally binding.
In Green v. Neil's Lessee,2 Mr. Justice McLean said, in the
course of his opinion, "If the construction of the highest
judicial tribunal of the state fomt a part of its statute law as
' Supra, p. 479.
2 Suipna, p. 481.
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much as an enactment of tze legislature,how can this court make
a distinction between them ?"
In Shelby v. Guy,' Mr. Justice Johnson uses the following
language: "Nor is it questionable, that a fixed and received
construction of their respective statute laws in their own
courts, makes in fact a part of the statute law of the country,
however we may doubt the propriety of that construction."
In Christy v. Pidgeon, Mr. Justice Field says, "If, therefore, different interpretations are given in different states to a
similar local law, that law in effect becomes by the interpretation, so far as it is a rule for our action, a different law in one
state from what it is in another." That is, the action of the
court changes the law since both acts are identical in language.
In Leffing-well v. Warren,' Mr. Justice Swayne says, "The
construction given to a statute of a state by the highest
judicial tribunal of such state, is regarded as a part qf such
statute,and is as binding upon the courts of the United States
as the text."
In Walker v. State Harbor Commissioners4 the court say,
referring to a state court's construction: "Whatever may be
our opinion as to its original soundness its interpretation is
accepted and it becomes a part of the statute as much as
incorporatedinto the body of it."
In Webster v. Cooper,5 the court, referring to the construction of the Constitution of Maine by its State Supreme Court,.
say, "this court receives such a settled construction as part of the
undamental law of the state."
These carefully worded expressions of the courts, if they
mean anything at all, must mean that the judicial construction
of state statutes is in fact a part of the law of the state. But
while not expressly contradicting the principles as here laid
down, the courts have, in certain classes of cases, been accustomed to ignore them. It is submitted that if this view as
I

ixi Wheat 361 (1826).

2

4 Wall, i96 (1866), Field, J.

3 Sufra, p. 533.
' 17 Wall, 648 (1873).
5 14 How. 48S (IS52).
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expressed so insistently by the courts be correct, then in later
decisions they have no right to disregard it. If this view of
the status of judicial construction be unsound, then the courts
should have the courage to say so and put an end to the
controversy at once.
Having satisfied ourselves that the courts have laid down
the rule as above stated, we will now proceed -to examine
cases where
B. The courts have, in fact, treated thejudicial interpretation
of state statutes by state courts, as being the law, not mere/' the
interpretationof the law.
The best known group of cases which support the statement just given, is, obviously, that class of which Gelpcke v.
Dubuque is the type. As these cases are all very similar in
the facts involved, a few general observations may be made
which will apply equally to all. In the first place they are
all cases which originated in the circuit courts, jurisdiction
being obtained by virtue of diverse citizenship. In the second
place, in each of this line of cases, a statute previously adjudged
valid by a state supreme court had been held void by the same
tribunal. This question was squarely in issue. Can rights be
acquired under a statute afterwards declared to be void? The
courts uniformly answered the question in the affirmative provided a state court had previously held the act valid. They
also said, that when those rights thus acquired, were contract
rights, the federal courts would protect them by virtue of the
clause in the Constitution of the United States, forbidding a
state to pass a law, impairing the obligation of contracts.
One of the earliest cases to follow Gelprke v. Dubuque was
Havemeyer v. Iowa Co.' That case came before the Circuit
Court of the United States for the District of Wisconsin, and
the court being divided, was brought to the Supreme Court
of the United States under the Act of Congress of April 29,
1802. The legislature of Wisconsin passed an act authorizing counties to issue bonds. The executive department
' 3 Wall,

294

(i865), Swayne, J.
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classified the act as a local act, which took effect from the
date of its passage. This view was affirmed by the Supreme
Court of Wisconsin. By later decisions the Supreme Court
of Wisconsin decided that this act was general in nature, was
not effective until published, and that the bonds in question
which had been issued before publication, were void. The
Supreme Court of the United States, following and approving
Gelpcke v. Dubuque, declared that the obligation of the contract should be protected, although the Supreme Court of
Wisconsin could construe their laws as they pleased. The
court unanimously speaking through Mr. Justice Swayne, say
these decisions "being long posterior to the time when
the securities were issued, they can have no effect on our decision and may be laid out of view. We can look only to
the condition of things when. they were sold. That brings
them within the rule laid down by this court, in Gelpcke v.
City of Dubuque. In that case it was held, that if the contract, when made, was valid by the constitution and laws of
the state, as then expounded by the highest authority whose
duty it was to administer them, no subsequent action by the
legislature or judiciary can impair its obligation. This rule
was established upon the most careful consideration. We
think it rests upon a solid foundation, and we feel no disposition to depart from it."
Two more cases very similar both in facts and decision folloN ed Naveyeer v. Iowa Co. during the next three years:
Thompson v. Lee Co.,' and Lee Co. v. Rogers.' Mr. Justice
Davis delivered the opinion in the former and Mr. Justice
Nelson in the latter, with no dissent in either case.
Shortly after this came the unfortunate decision in Butz v.
City of Muscatine.3 In this case an act had been passed by
the legislature of Iowa authorizing the issuance of certain
bonds. Before any judicial decision as to the validity of the
statute, as far as appeared, the bonds in question were issued.
A subsequent decision of the Supreme Court of Iowa de'3 Wall, 327 (i865). Davis, J.
7 Wall, I8I (1868), Nelson, J.
38 Wall, 575 (1869), Swayne, J.
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clared the act unconstitutional. The court refused to follow
the state decision, alleging that its effect was to impair the
obligation of the contract. Mr. Justice Miller dissented,
making use of very strong language not unmixed with sarcastic allusions to the opinion of the majority. The Chief
Justice concurred in the dissent. Whether or not the other
cases discussed are sound on principle, it is submitted that this
decision went beyond the bounds of authority. We have
examined, as we believe, most of the leading cases on this
subject, and, so far as we are able to judge; no other case has
taken the position taken by Mr. Justice Swayne and the
majority of the court in this case. Gelpcke v. Dubuque and
the line of cases following it, decide only this: That whenever
a Supreme Court of a state has adopted a construction for a
particular local law, such construction becomes part of the
local law. The court then by changing its view, practically
amends the law. Such an amendment can no more have a
retroactive effect than can an amendment passed by the legislature. This limitation does not, in either case, affect the
amendment as to the future. Similarly, the bankrupt laws
were held valid as to the future, but not in their application
to existing contracts. The court recognizes the right and the
duty of the state court to change its ruling, if necessary; it
merely protects existing contracts.
This is very far from saying, that one who relies on his own
construction of a statute, will be protected against the consequences of his own error.
Until the state court has once acted, there can be no impairment by construction. When the law is passed, contract
rights acquired under it are protected from legislative repeal.
When a construction of a statute has once been made, contracts made on the faith of it are similarly protected from
judicial action. That is the limitation of the doctrine.
May it not be supposed that Mr. Justice Swayne leaned in
this case too far one way, perhaps to counterbalance Mr. Justice Miller, who by the vigor of his language in the dissenting
opinion, conveys to us the unavoidable impression that a discussion of some warmth had been precipitated. But however
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that may have been, we submit with great deference that this
decision stands absolutely alone, and cannot be supported,
either by reason or authority.
In Township of Pine Grove v. Talcott,' the facts were similar
to Gelpcke v. Dubuque. Mr. Justice Swayne, in delivering the
opinion, again suffers himself to discuss the question as to the
constitutionality of the state statute. He carefully goes over
the question as to its validity or invalidity. It is submitted
that the court had no right whatever to consider this question.
It would be absurd as well as intolerable to imagine for one
moment that the federal court could force a state to adopt for
the future a different construction from that which its courts
had settled upon. The argument, that the states should be
prevented from putting a palpably wrong construction upon
their statutes, cannot be supported. The obligations of a state
are binding only upon its conscience To say that the federal
court has the right to force the state to adopt a "reasonable
construction" of a law, when there is no power to prevent it
from repudiating its obligations absolutely, is plainly untenable.
As in Gelpcke v. Dubuque, near the end of his opinion, Mr.
Justice Swayne gives expression to the real ground of the
decision. He says, "The national Constitution forbids the
- states to pass laws impairing the obligation of contracts.
In
cases properly before us, that end can be accomplished unwarrantably, no more by judicial decisions than by legislation.
Were we to yield in cases like this to the authority of the
decisions of the respective states, we should abdicate the performance of one of the most important duties with which this
tribunal is charged, and disappoint the wise and salutary policy
of the framers of the Constitution in providing for the creation
of an independent federal judiciary. The exercise of our
appellate jurisdiction would be but a solemn mockery."
Douglas v. County of Pike' contains one of the clearest
statements of this view that has been written. This case came
up on a writ of error to the Circuit Court of the United States
I i9 Wall, 666 (x873), Swayne, J.
2 Hare on Constitutional Law, Lecture XXXMI.
ioi U. S. 677 (1879), Waite, C.J.
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for the Eastern District of Missouri. It was an action on
three hundred and twenty-one coupons, detached from bonds
issued by the County of Pike, .Missouri. The county had
been authorized, by an act of the legislature, to issue the
bonds in question. This act had been repeatedly construed
to be constitutional, by the highest court of- the state. Long
after the issuance of the bonds, another decision. of the Supretne Court of Missouri held the act to be unconstitutional.
Mr. Chief Justice Waite uses the following language: "The
true rule is to give a change of judicial construction in respect
to a statute, the same effect in its operation on contracts and
existing contract rights, that would be given to a legislative
amendment; that is to say, make it prospective but noi retroactive. After a statute has been settled by judicial construction, the construction becomes, so far as contract rights
acquired under it are concerned, as much a part of the statute
as the text itself; and a change of decision is, to all intents
and purposes, the same in its effect on contracts as az amendment of the law by means of a legislative enactment. So far as
this case is concerned, we have no hesitation in saying that
the rights of the parties are to be determined according to
the law as it was judicially construed to be, when the bonds
in question were put upon the market as commercial paper.
We recognize fully, not only the right of a state court, but
its duty, to change its decisions whenever in its judgment the
necessity arises. It may do this for new reasons, or because
of a change of opinion in respect to old ones, and ordinarily
we will follow them, except so far as they affect rights vested
before the change was made. . . . If the township aid act
had not been repealed by the new constitution of 1875, which
took away from all municipalities the power of subscribing to
the stock of railroads, the new decisions would be binding in
respect to all issues of bonds after they were made; but we
cannot give them a retroactive effect without impairing the obligation of contracts long before entered into. This we feel ourselves prohibited by the Constitution of the United States from
doing." Unlike the opinions of Mr. Justice Swayne in similar
cases, there is here no ambiguity as to the ground of the
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decision. In Anderson v. Santa Anna,' Mr. Justice Harlan
quotes the above language of Mr. Chief Justice Waite with
approval and emphatically reasserts the same doctrine.
Louisiana v. PJ'sbZery2 came up by a writ of error to the
Supreme Court of the State of Louisiana. The case came up
under the 25th section of the judiciary act; the facts involved
a repudiation of bonded obligations by the City of New Orleans. This had been brought about by means both of a
change of construction of existing statutes, and by a later act
passed by the legislature of the State of Louisiana, and which
was upheld by the decision reviewed. The doctrine that states
are prohibited by the federal clause from impairing the obligation of contracts by state decisions, as well as by state
statutes, was carefully considered. Mr. Justice Field with no
dissent delivered the opinion of the court. Beginning on
page 294, the court say, "The exposition given by the highest
tribunal of a state must be taken as correct, so far as contracts
made under the act are concerned. Their validity and obligation cannot be impaired by any subsequent decision altering
the construction. This doctrine applies as well to the construction of a provision of the organic law, as to the construction of a statute. The construction, so far as contract obligations incurred under it are concerned, constitutes a part of
the law as much as if embodied in it. So far does this
doctrine extend, that when a statute of two states, expressed
in the same terms, is construed differently by the highest
courts, they are treated by us as different laws, each embodying the particular construction of its own state, and enforced
in accordance with it in all cases arising under it."
The discussion of this line of cases would be incomplete
did we not include the Pennsylvania case of Ray v. Thte Gas
Co., decided in i89O. In this case the plaintiff in error
claimed that a contract, which he had entered into, would be
impaired were the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania to follow
its own ruling on a question of general law and adjudge his
1 zX6 U. S. 356 (1885), Harlan, J.
2 iO5 U. S. 278 (I88x), Field, J.
3

138 Pa. 591 (i89o), Clark, J.
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contract void. lie based his contention upon the fact that
previous decisions of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania had
taken a different view of the laws and that he had contracted
on the faith of such ruling. The court refused to adopt his
view. They admitted the justice of his contention in all cases
where such change of decision had been a change in the construction of a statute, but denied its application in.the present
case, because no question of the construction of a statute Was
involved.
The opinion clearly points out the two classes of cases
and the distinction between them. The opinion of the court
was delivered by Mr. Justice Clark with no dissent. On page
590 lie says, "The courts of highest authority of all the
states and of the United states are not infrequently called upon
to change their rulings upon questions of highest importance.
In so doing, the doctrine is not that the law is changed, but
that the court was mistakcn in its former decision, and that
the law is, and really always was, as it is expounded in the
later decision upon the subject. The members of the judiciary
can in no sense be said to make or change the law; they
simply expound it and apply it to individual cases. To this
generaldoctrine there is one well-establishedexception, asfollows:
'After a statute has been settled by judicial construction, the
construction becomes, so far as contract rights are concerned, as
much a part of the statute, as the text itself, and a change of
decision is to all intents andpurposes the same in effect on contracts as an amendment of the law by means of a legislative
enactment.'"
The court then cites with approval Douglas v. Co. of Pike,
Anderson v. Santa Anna, Gelpcke v. DOubuque, etc., and
quoting at length from the opinion in Ohio Trust Co. v.
Debolt, thus sums up the law: "This ruling applies, it will be
observed, not to the general law, common to all the states,
but to the laws of the state 'as expounded by all the departments of its government,' and it is held that contracts valid
by these laws may not be impaired 'either by subsequent
legislation or by the decisions of its courts altering their construction. The reference is, of course, to the statute law.' "
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In addition a few cases which lay down.the same principle arecited in the note.'
In-connection with this phase of the subject, it is thought
profitable to refer to another class of decisions quite similar to
the one just discussed. Reference is here made to that large
body of cases, where the act of the state embodies a contract
made between the state and an individual. To take a typical
case. The legislature of the state passes a law which confers
contract rights upon an individual or upon a class of individuals. The terms of the act are complied with by these
individuals, who thereby enter into a contract with the state..
The state then passes another act which impairs the obligation of the contract. The State Supreme Court upholds thelatter act on the ground that the former act conferred no contract rights, and since there was no contract, there could be
no impairment. In such cases the Supreme Court of the
United States-claims the right to investigate for itself and,
determine whether in fact a contract exists, and then to protect the obligation of that contract from impairment. These.
cases are sometimes referred to as laying down the principle
that the federal courts have the right to construe the statelaw whenever that law embodies in its terms a contract. This
we believe to be too broad. In such cases the court claims
the right to determine for itself whether a contract exists; but
it does not have the right to decide as to the validity or invalidity of the act. It is submitted that while embodied in
the same langu.ge, the act and the contract which it creates,.
are two different things. The act cannot of itself be a contract. Acceptance of its terms by those to whom the offer
is made is a condition precedent. The contract is a relation
I The City v. Lamson, 9 Wall, 477 (1869); County of Leavenworth v.
Barnes, 94 U. S. 70 (1876); Boyd v. Alabama, 94 U. S. 645 (1876); Town
of S. Ottawa v. Perkins, 94 U. S. 261 (1876); County v. Douglas, io5 U.
S. 728 (i881), Waite, C. J. ; Green v. County of Conness, io9 U. S. 104,
Bradley, J.; Taylor v. Ypsilanti, io5 U. S. 6o (i88r), Harlan, J.; Union
Bank v. Board, go Fed. 7 (1898) ; Louisville T. Co. v. Cincinnati, 76
r
Fed. 296 (iS96); Loeb v. Trustees, 9 Fed. 37 (1899); Wilson v. .Perrin,
ii C. C. A. 66 and note (x894), Lurton, J.; Hill. V. Hite,.29 C. C. A. 54g
and note (1898), Phillips, J.
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between the state and the individual. That relation the court
may investigate. To hold otherwise would be to deprive the
federal courts of their appellate power; for what would be
easier for the state court than to declare in every instance"that
the contract itself being void, there could be no impairment.
The federal courts, having acquired jurisdiction, always have
the right to determine whether a contract in fact exists, and
then 'to protect that contract from an impairment of its obligation; they necessarily have this power as an appropriate
and necessary means of enforcing the constitutional prohibition, with which duty they are intrusted. But at the same
time the question as to the constitutionality of the act upon
which the contract is based, is a question into which the
federal courts cannot inquire. The question of the power of
the legislature to pass the act is one thing; the question as
to whether it actually confers contract rights is another. It
is obvious that on principle this conclusion must be reached,
for how can the subject matter of an act affect the power, or
rather the lack of power, of the federal courts to construe it?
We have shown that the power does not exist. An incident
of the subject matter of the act cannot confer it. It is believed
that the cases will bear out this distinction, and it is earnestly
insisted that on principle no other conclusion can be supported.
The earliest leading case of this class is State Bank of Ohio
v. Knoop.' Ohio passed an act in 1845, by which it was provided for the organization of state banks. Among other
privileges, it was provided that such banks should be allowed
to pay the state six per cent. of their net profits, in lieu of
taxes. "This compact was accepted, and on the faith of it
fifty banks were organized, which are still .in operation. Up
to the year 1837, I believe, the banks, the profession and the
bench, considered this as a contract and binding upon the
state and upon the banks. For more than thirty-five years
this mode of taxing the dividends of banks had been sanctioned in the State of Ohio." In 1851 an act was passed,
providing for the taxation of these banks. The state bank
1 16 How. 391 (1853), McLean, J.
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of Ohio resisted payment on the ground that the later act
was unconstitutional, because it impaired the obligation of its
contract. The Ohio Supreme Court decided that the former
act did not create contract rights, and on that ground upheld
the later act. The question of the construction of the later
act was in no way involved. Before we attempt to interpret
the court's language, let us note exactly what questions were
before it. In the first place, as we have seen, an act had been
passed which offered certain immunities to state banks. The
state court decided two questions:
(I) That under the constitution of Ohio, the general assembly had no power to pass such an act.
(2) That even if the act were valid, no contract rights were
created by the particular relation here established between the
state and the bank.
On these two grounds, either of which was sufficient, the
state court held that there could be no impairment, since
there was no contract.'
As we have pointed out, the Supreme Court of the United
States has no right to consider the first question; the state
court's judgment as to the validity of the state's own law, in
reference to the state constitution, is conclusive. That the
.upreme Court could investigate the second question, there
can be no doubt. But it is plain that to reach the conclusion
which they did, the Supreme Court must have decided
(I) That the law of 1845, as far as this contract, at least,
is concerned, was a valid law.
(2) That a binding contract was created between the state
and the bank.
That the court had the power to decide the second point is
conceded. That they had not the power to decide the first
question in the abstract is emphatically asserted. That in
this case they had the right and the duty laid upon them to
protect this contract, if one existed, is believed to be correct,
but the only legitimate manner in which to do this, was to
prevent the state court in this case from applying a later conI Debolt

v. Ohio Life & Trust Co., i Ohio, 564.

GELPCKE VERSUS DUBUQUE.

struction, when the contract had been entered into upon the
faith of a former construction. The question then arises, had
the state court of Ohio formerly, held this act valid, now construed by it to be void. We gain little or no enlightenment
upon this point by an examination of the opinions in Debolt
v. Tlze Insurance Co., ' but from the language of Mr. Chief
Justice Taney in the same case when it came before the Supreme Court of the United States, we should infer that the
state court had formerly construed the act to be a valid exercise of constitutional power.2 The same thought is conveyed
by Mr. Justice McLean in the sentence quoted above, when
he declares that "for more than thirty-five years this mode of
taxing had been sanctioned in the State of Ohio, by the profession, the banks and the bench."
On the principle that a state construction of a state statute,
or constitution, becomes a part of the law, and contract rights
acquired under it cannot thereafter be divested, we can support the conclusion in this case. That Mr. Chief Justice
Taney did support the case on that ground, is evident from
an examination of his opinion; but Mr. Justice McLean, who
delivered the opinion of the court, did not consider this point
in terms. Indeed, his remarks upon the question we are discussing do not seem entirely clear. On page 390 he says,
"The rule observed by this court to follow the construction
of the statute of the state by its Supreme Court, is strongly
urged. This is done when we are required to administer the
laws of the state. The established construction of a statute
of the state is received as a part of the statute. But we are
called in the case before us, not to carry into effect a law of
the state, but to test the validity of such a. law by the Constitution of the Union. We are exercising an appellate jurisdiction. The decision of the Supreme Court of the state is
before us for revision, and if their construction of the contract
in question impairs its obligation, we are required to reverse
their judgment."
' Supra, p. 554.
2 See opinion of Taney, C. J., Grier with him, Ohio Life Ins. & Trust

Co. v. Debolt, I6 How. at p. 43z.
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It will be noted here that the eminent justice declares that,
in ordinary cases, the "established construction of a statute
of the state is received as a part of the statute." The only
construction of the state court which was under consideration,
was their construction of the law of 1845. Mr. Justice McLean
thefi continues, "But we are called in the case before us, not
to carry into effect a law of the state, but to test the validity
of such a law by the Constitution of the Union." What law
does he refer to in this sentence? He cannot mean the law
of 185 x, because there was no question as to its construction
before the court, and no one had thought of urging that its
construction by the state court should be followed, for, as a
matter of fact, the state court had not construed it. He cannot mean the law of 1845, because it could not impair a contract entered into after its passage. If the rest of his opinion
were at all consistent with this view, we should say that he
must have referred by "law" to the later construction of the
act of 1845, for that was what, in reality, did impair the
obligation of the contract. Indeed, by the following sentence, he declares this to be the fact: "The decision of
the Supreme Court of the state is before us for revision,
and if their construction of the contract in question impairs
-its obligation, we are required to reverse their judgment."
He says in one sentence, "we are testing the validity of
a law;" in the next he says, "we are judging the validity
of a construction of a contract." The conclusion seems
clear that he considered the "construction"
to be the
"law."
It is submitted that-by "construction of the contract" here,
is really meant the construction of the act of 1845. The
learned justice does not seem to distinguish the two, and from
the context we must infer that such was his meaning. Moreover, in no sense can a -construction of a contract be said to
impair its obligation. If this were conceded, every time a
court adjudged a contract void it would impair its obligation.
But this is not impairment. In such a case one merely enters
into a relation, which he conceives to be a contract, but in
which conception he has fallen into error. Mr. Cooley, in his
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work on Constitutional Law,' says, "no promise or assurance
can, therefore, constitute a contract, unless the law lends its
sanction." It follows that there-can be no impairment of the
obligation of the contract, unless there has been a change in
the law. In all other cases it is merely a mistaken conception
as to what the law is.
We are able to place upon these words of Mr. .Justice McLean no construction except this: that the reinterpretation' of
the act of 1845, by the state court, was a law impairing the
obligation of the contract, and it was for that reason that the
Supreme Court refused to follow the state decision, which
applied that reinterpretation to the case before it.
But however this may have been, there is no question of
the attitude of some of the other justices. Mr. Chief Justice
Taney, concurring, announces that his opinion is embodied in
his opinion delivered in Ohio Insurance Co. v. Debolt,2 in which
case, as we will show later, he distinctly places his concurrence
on the principle we have suggested.
Mr. Justice Catron, dissenting, clearly recognizes the act of
1845, and the contract created under it, to be two separate
and distinct things. He adopts the opinion of Mr. Justice
Campbell, that there was, in fact, no contract. He then goes
on to discuss the question of the power of the state to pass
exemption laws, and then says: "General principles, however, have little application to the real question before us,
which is this: Has the constitution of Ohio withheld from the
legislature the authority to grant by contract with individuals
the sovereign power, and are we bound to hold her constitution to mean, as her Supreme Court has construed it to mean?
If the decisions in Ohio have settled the question in the
affirmative, that the sovereign political power is not the subject of an irrepealable contract, then few will be so bold as to
deny that it is our duty to conform to the construction they
have settled; and the only objection to conformity, that I
suppose could exist with any one is, that the construction is
not settled." He then shows the construction to be settled,
P. 313.

Sup ra, p. 555.
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declares it to be his belief that the law is invalid, and that no
contract rights were created even it had been, and thus concludes : "But if I am mistaken in both* these conclusions,
then, I am of opinion, that by the express provisions of the
constitution of Ohio, of i8o2, the legislature of that state had
withheld from its powers the authority to tie up the hands of
subsequent legislatures in the exercise of the powers of taxation, and this opinion rests on judicial authority that this court
is bound to follow; the Supreme Court of Ohio having held,
by various solemn and unanimous decisions, that the political
power of taxation was one of those reserved rights intended
to be delegated by the people to each successive legislature,
and to be exercised alike by every legislature according to the
instructions of the people. . . . Whether this construction
given to the state constitution is the proper one, is not a subject of inquiry in this court; it belongs exclusively to the
state courts, and can no more be questioned by us, than state
courts and judges can question our construction of the Constitution of the United States."
This opinion is quoted somewhat at length to show that
Mr. Justice Catron draws the distinction contended for. He
does not deny the power of the Supreme Court to interpret
the contract for itself. He does deny its power to decide as
to the validity of the act.
Mr. Justice Daniel concurs with Campbell, who dissents on
the ground that there was no contract created by the acceptance of the terms of the act by the bank.
In Ohio Life Znsurance and Trust Co. v. Debolt,l Mr. Chief
justice Taney uses the following language (the facts were as
to this point identical with Bank v. Knoop): "This brings
me to the question more immediately before the court: Did
the constitution of Ohio authorize its legislature, by contract,
to exempt this company from its equal share of the public
burdens, during the continuance of its charter? The Supreme
Court of Ohio in the case before us decided that it did not.
But this charter was granted while the constitution of i8o2
' Sufira, p. 555.
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was in force, and it is evident that this decision is in conflict
with the uniform construction of that constitution during the
whole period of its existence. It appears from the acts of the
legislature, that the power was repeatedly exercised, vhile
that constitution was in force, and acquiesced in by the people
of the state. It was directly and distinctly sanctioned, by the
Supreme Court of the state, in the case of the State v. The
Commercial Bank of Cincinnati, 7 Ohio, 125"And when the constitution of a state, for nearly half a
century, has received one uniform and unquestioned construetion by all the departments of the government, legislative,
executive and judicial, I think it must be regarded as the true
one. It is true that this court always follows the decisions
of the state courts in the construction of their own constitutions and laws. But where those decisions are in conflict, this
court must determine between them. And certainly a construction acted on as undisputed for nearly fifty years by
every department of the government, and supported by judicial decision, ought to be sufficient to give to the instrument
a fixed and definite meaning. Contracts with the state authorities were made under it. And upon a question as to the
validity of such a contract, the court, upon the soundest principles of justice, is bound to adopt the construction it received
from the state at the time the contract was made." The Chief
Justice then refers to the case of Rowan v. Runnels, points
out that the principles are the same whether jurisdiction is
acquired by virtue of diverse citizenship or by virtue of the
subject matter, and continues, "Indeed the duty imposed upon
this court to enforce contracts honestly and legally made,
would be vain and nugatory, if we were bound to follow those
changes in judicial decisions, which the lapse of time and the
change in judicial officers will often produce. The writ of
error to a state court would be no protection to a contract, if
we were bound to follow the judgment which the state court
had given, and which the writ of error brings up for revision
here. And the sound and true rule is, that if the contract,
when made, was valid by the laws of the state, as then expounded by all the departments of its government, and ad-
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ministered in its courts of justice, its validity and obligation
cannot be impaired by any subsequent act of the legislature
of the state, or decisions of its courts altering the construction
of the law."
Having thus dealt with the argument that the court must
accept the state court's judgment as to the unconstitutionality
af the statute, Mr. Chief Justice Taney takes up the question
of whether, in fact, a contract had been created. He first declares the right of the Supreme Court to examine "the instrument claimed to be a contract," saying, "I proceed, therefore, to examine whether there is any contract in the acts of
the legislature relied on by the plaintiff in error, which deprives the state of the power of levying upon the stock and
property of the company its equal share of the taxes deemed
necessary for the support of the government," and after a
careful and exhaustive opinion, announces his conclusion that
no contract existed, and, on that ground, affirms the judgment.
In this opinion Grier concurs on all points. Catron concurs in the conclusion that no contract had been created; does
not dissent from the doctrine that the early interpretation of
the act must be followed in cases where the state court has
changed its view, but expresses his opinion that the Ohio
courts had not previously passed upon the constitutionality
of the act.
Justices Daniel and Campbell also concur, while Justices
McLean, Wayne, Curtis and Nelson dissent, but none of them
attack the principle that the state court must be prevented
from impairing the obligation of contracts by changing the
interpretation of state statutes.
In interpreting the language of Mr. Chief Justice Taney,
where he says the construction so long concurred in must be
accepted as the true one, we must remember that the constitution of 1802 was no longer in force, and that no question
could arise as to future construction. The later decision could
operate only retroactively if at all. This gives his statement
its true significance, while otherwise it would appear too broad.
These two decisions have been examined somewhat at
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length, in order that there may be no misunderstanding in the
further investigation of this line of cases, as to the points
they involve. Bank v. Knoop and InsuranceCo. v. Debolt are
authority for the following principles of law:
(i) When a state legislature passes an act purportingto contain a contract, there are two separate and distinct problems
presented.
(a) Is the act constitutionalf
(b) Has a contract been created?
(2) The United.States Court have the right to examine for
hemselves whether or not a contracthas been created.
(3) The United States Court have not the right to examine
the interpretationby the state court of the constitutionalito(state).
of the act, but must accept it as final.
(4) The United States Court (having acquiredjurisdictionby
virtue of the fact that a later act has been passed which would
impair the obligation of contracts ifthere were any), may refuse
to apoply a decision of a state court, adudgingan act void, in a
case where contract rights have been acquiredunder a former
construction by that court, adjudgingit valid.
The last principle, it will be noted, differs only from the
conclusions drawn from the class of cases represented by
Gelpcke v. Dubuque, in that in the one case jurisdiction is
acquired by virtue of diverse citizenship, in the other, by
virtue of the subject matter. The principle, obviously, is the
same in each case. In Farmers'and lechanics' Bank of Pa.
v. Smith,' Mr. Chief Justice Marshall made the following very
pointed statement, "that this case was not distinguishable
from the former decisions of the court on the same point,
except by the circumstances that the defendant, in the present
case, was a citizen of the same state as the plaintiff, at the time
the contract was made in that state, and remained such at the
time the suit was commenced in its courts. But these facts
made no difference in this case. The Constitution of the
United States was made for the whole people of the Union,
and is equally binding on all the courts and on all the
citizens."
16 Wheat. 131 (1821), Marshall, C.J..
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The cases cited in the note will be found to support the
principle, that the Supreme Court of the United States may
always construe the contract of the state, when it is alleged
that the obligation of that contract has been impaired by subsequent legislation. While most of them do not deal explicitly
with the distinction between the act and the contract which it
helps to create, the decisions are .not inconsistent with this
principle.
In McCullough v. The Commonwealth of Virginia,' it is distinctly pointed out. On page 138 Mr. Justice Brewer says;
"Neither is the argument a sound one. It ignores the
difference between the statte and the contract, and confuses
the two entirely distinct matters of construction and validity.
The statute precedes the contract. Its scope and meaning
must be determined before any question will arise as to the
validity of the contract which it authorizes." Of course the
question as to the validity of the act would arise before either
of thesc. 2
Lastly we wish to call especial attention to the case of Pease
v. Peck3 This case came up by a writ of error to the Circuit
Court of Michigan. The question here was not as to the construction of a statute, but as to what the statute in fact was.
The statute of limitations, as passed, did not contain a saving
clause, excepting persons "beyond seas." Such a clause was
inserted in the published copy. For a long period the statute
was treated by the courts as containing this provision. A copy
of the original act having subsequently been discovered, and
the Supreme Court of Michigan having determined that its
former treatment of the statute was incorrect, it was urged
1172 U. S. 102 (1898),
2

Brewer, J.

jefferson Branch Bank v. Skelley, i Black. 436 (i86i); Bridge Proprietors v. Hoboken Co., i Wall. xx6 (x86) ; University v. The People,
99 U. S. 309 (1878), Miller, J. ; Louisville & Nashville R. R. v. Palmes,
io9
U. S. 244 (x883) ; Louisville Gas Co. v. Citizens Gas Co., 115 U. S.
683 (1885), Harlan, J. ; Wright v. Nagle, xor U. S. 791 ; Mobile & Ohio
R. R. v. Tenn., 153 U. S. 497 (1893), Jackson, J. ; Huntingdon v. Attrill,
x46 U. S. 657; Bryan v. The Board of Education, IS U. S. 639 (893),
Harlan, J.; McCullough v. The Com. of Va., 172 U. S. 102 (1898),
Brewer, J.
3 I8 How. 599 (IS55), Grier, J.

GELPCKE VERSUS DUBUQUE.

that the United States Court should apply the latter construction in the case before it. This the court refused to do. The
language of Mr. Justice Grier -is: "The territorial lav in
question had been received and acted upon for thirty yeai-s, in
the words of the published statute. It has received a settled
construction by the courts of the United States, as well as of
the state. It had entered as an element into the contracts
and business of men.
On a sudden, a manuscript statute,
differing from the known public law, is disinterred from the
lumber room of obsolete documents. A new law is promulgated by judicial construction which, by retro-action, destroys
vested rights of property of citizens of other states, while it
protects the citizens of Michigan from the payment of admitted
debts."
This statement, it will be perceived, is very strong. It
assumes that a meaning is engrafted into a legislative enactment, that was never there. This is done by means of judicial
construction.
Mr. Justice Campbell and Mr. Justice Daniel dissented, but
solely on the ground that they did not think it appeared that
the Supreme Court of Michigan had ever. construed the
statute. They expressly admitted the points of law laid down
by the court.
It should be noted that Mr. Justice Grier did not deny the
right of the Supreme Court of Michigan "to promulgate a new
law," but only denied the right of any state court to apply that
law to existing contracts. It is submitted that, if this decision
be sound, it must follow as a matter of logic, that a court, by
its construction, may change a law in fact. Here the law, as
passed, did not contain a clause which the.courts of Michigan
said it did. The Supreme Court of the United States say that
during that period, the law was what the Michigan courts said
it was. This can mean only one thing. The court's declaration changed the law. It is submitted; after this examination
of the cases, that, rightly or wrongly, the courts- have actually
decided,
(x) Judicial interpretation of state statutes by state courts
makes, infact, a part of the law of the state.
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A change of judicial interpretationis, in fact, an amendment of the law.
(3) When state courts have so applied such an amendment as
to impair the obligation of a contract,the federal courts, when
they have acquiredjurisdicton by virtue of diverse citizenship,
will refuse to follow the decision, because to do so would be to
apply a "law," (i. e., the altered interpretation,not its application to the contract) which impairs the obligation of contracts,
and which is forbidden by thefederal constitution.
(2)

Thomas Raeburn White.
(To be continued.)

